priddy on fri 29 sep 00
hal mc whinnie wrote:
> Let me explain more about my point of view. I have advanced the followi=
ng
> philosophical argument:
> =
> 1] an artists, any artist has an absolute right to be able to make use =
of
> all that has gone before them in the history of art for their own creat=
ive
> purposes. this right has a history as long as art itself which of cours=
e is
> far longer then the mere 200 years of the us copyright laws.
you might even say that it is a natural right in that the artist is incap=
able
of avoiding the activity. Because artists' acts of creation are
manifestations of their cumulative experience, even when the art is not
obviously visible in the artifact created, the ideation is utilized.
=
> 2] a work of art[ not the artist] has an absolute right not to be abuse=
d in
> anyway that is either physically, or by a poor interpretation review or=
> opinion. this right resides in the work of art, not in the estate, or t=
he
> artists, or the present owner.
this is not correct. "rights" are elements of social contract theory. S=
ince
artifacts cannot make social contracts, they cannot have rights. This is=
simply a technical fact, I am not disputing your intention, mainly your
phrasing. But as it has been mentioned ad nauseum of late, words mean th=
ings.
In philosophical arguments of aesthetics, words mean everything. =
You might correctly say: any individual has an ethical obligation to resp=
ect
the integrity of any artifact by not destroying or physically harming it.=
But
that is the extent of obligation an individual has to a thing. And even =
that
obligation is limited in that the owner of the object can do what they wi=
sh
with it, including destroying it. The intellectual property is only
containable as long as the thing is under wraps. Once you have let peopl=
e
view it at all, the thing is now in the marketplace of ideas and fair gam=
e for
anyone to ideate from. Or more colloquially, the genie is out!
Now, as rational people with respect for things of beauty and respect for=
the
creations of others, one would choose not to destroy them. And there may=
be
some obligation among individuals to OFFER beauty to other humans rather =
than
locking it away just out of social duty. But there is no natural right
associated with things to exist without mutilation.
> these two rights are absolute and are in conflict one with the other. t=
he
> tension produced by that conflict is at the very heart of the creative =
act.
> =
> When an artists decides to use the work or part of the work of another =
they
> must address this question, how much abuse to the work of art are they
> willing to tolerate in order to make their own work?
I don't perceive conflict here because the natural right associated with =
posit
1 obtains over posit 2. By that, I mean that posit 2 is essentially inco=
rrect
BECAUSE of posit 1. Otherwise, we would be self-censored in our ideation=
to
the point of unreasonable limits on our creativity. =
Copyrights on intellectual property are notoriously hard to protect and I=
, for
one, think that they are ludicrous. Once the idea of something is expres=
sed,
posit 1 makes it the case that individuals in perceptible range of the id=
ea
have no choice but to be encumbered by it from that point forth. Even if=
you
wanted to not know about it from that point on, you can't. Therefore, th=
e
idea is an intrinsic intangible and therefore cannot be owned or legally
conveyed(sold, requiring ownership to begin with, which I am arguing is
impossible). But this is epistemiology, and we probably don't really want=
to
go there.
At least that is what I think....but I am as I have stated elsewhere:
often wrong, NEVER in doubt...
although I don't think I am about this, but that is always the case, such=
is
the problem....
respectfully submitted,
elizabeth priddy
priddy-clay@usa.net
http://www.angelfire.com/nc/clayworkshop
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